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ABSTRACT 
Less than three years after the historic election of President Vicente Fox in July 2000, 
Mexico passed a professional career service reform law (Ley de Servicio Profesional de 
Carrera, 2003) for national government ministries.  This law, and the linked 
transformations in governance and political and administrative culture that underlie it, 
have stimulated public administrative reform at all levels of Mexican government – 
national, state and local. This paper:  (1) presents a conceptual frame for the evolution 
of public personnel systems in developing countries, (2) describes Mexico’s 
professional career service law (LSPC) and the historical conditions that led up to it, 
(3) places the LSPC in the context of underlying changes in Mexican governance, 
political culture and institutions, and (4) uses selected economic, social, political and 
administrative indicators to benchmark the impact of the LSPC and these related 
changes on public administrative reform in Mexico today. 
 
EVOLVING PUBLIC PERSONNEL SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: A CONCEPTUAL FRAME 
The evolution of public management in developing countries appears relatively uniform 
because pressures for modernization and democratization tend to parallel though lag 
behind those in the Western world.  While many of these administrative innovations are 
diffused by Western consultants or adopted due to exposure to the West (Adamolekun, 
1990; Sabet and Klingner, 1993), Western lenders have also often mandated 
administrative reforms as a condition of continued credit (Klingner, 1996; Salgado, 
1997). 
During Stage I, elite leaders of successful independence movements establish new 
nations.  The transition to Stage II (patronage) follows as these emergent nations 
strengthen the conditions in civil society that underlie effective government (such as 
education, political participation, economic growth, and social justice) by refining their 
constitutions, developing political parties, and creating public agencies.  This transition 
is often difficult, particularly if the culture supports political leadership based on 
personalities rather than parties.  
The transition to Stage III (merit) is marked by passage of a civil service law, creation 
of an oversight agency, and development of personnel policies and procedures.  It is 
driven by internal pressures for modernization (efficiency) and democratization (human 
rights).  International lenders often add external pressures for enhanced government 
capacity and macroeconomic development.  Again, this transition may be difficult, or it 
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may not occur at all.  Governments may be large and/or inefficient due to socialist 
traditions favoring autonomous agencies (e.g., railroads, airlines, petroleum, banking, 
health and hospitals, and insurance) that in developed countries are usually part of the 
private sector.  Pressures for transparent, honest and efficient government may be 
thwarted by corruption, use of the public sector as the employer of last resort, or a 
“brain drain” to the private sector because of a politically vulnerable, underpaid and 
poorly qualified civil service. 
If and when the transition to civil service occurs, developing countries then seek to 
balance conflicting values and personnel systems to achieve the contradictory objectives 
that characterize Stage IV (mature mixed) public personnel management:  establishing 
an optimum level of public employment, maintaining administrative efficiency and 
protecting public employee rights, and achieving both uniformity and flexibility of 
personnel policies and procedures.  As the economy develops, there is less pressure on 
the government to be the employer of last resort, and more support for government 
because professional public management is more effective at public service delivery 
desired services to the public.  However, the opposite may occur just as easily – 
economic stagnation may generate political pressure to increase public employment.  
Colonial traditions and centralization tend to produce a uniformity that outweighs 
administrative flexibility and diversity.  “Neo-liberal” economic policies (imposed by 
international lenders to promote economic development) do reduce external debt by 
cutting public employment and expenditures.  But they may also increase 
unemployment, social injustice, and popular discontent with elected leaders or the entire 
political system.   
Emergent systems do not supplant their predecessors, but instead conflict and combine 
with them.  Thus, the evolutionary process described below in Figure 1 results in 
increasingly complex combinations and permutations of public human resource 
management (HRM) systems -- patronage, merit, market-based contracting and 
privatization, and others. 





























Limited government  
Patronage + 
Civil service + 
Collective bargaining + 
Privatization 
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among pro- and anti-
governmental values 
and systems 
Source: Klingner, 1996; Klingner, 2000; Klingner and Nalbandian, 2001; Klingner and 
Pallavicini Campos, 2002; Klingner and Nalbandian, 2003. 
But as was noted above, there is no guarantee that public HRM systems will progress 
automatically or steadily through these four evolutionary stages.  Conditions may 
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dictate that a country remains “stuck” at some point, or regresses.  A variety of political, 
social and economic factors serve as benchmarks for the progression from one stage of 
public human resource management to another.  This conceptual model was originally 
presented in Klingner (1996), and has been explicated elsewhere (Klingner, 2000; 
Klingner and Nalbandian, 2001; Klingner and Pallavicini Campos, 2002; Klingner and 
Nalbandian, 2003). 
 
Figure 2:  Political Culture and Public Personnel Management Development 
1. From Independence (Stage I) to Patronage (Stage II) 
Indicator 
Political Freedom (Speech and Media) 
Economic Growth and Development 
Racial and Ethnic Discrimination 

















2. From Patronage (Stage II) to Civil Service (Stage III) 
Indicator 
 
Effective & Transparent Government 
Administrative Formalism 
Patronage Influences 
A Civil Service Law has been passed 
A central public personnel agency exists 
Merit system procedures are in place 
Unemployment or underemployment 
Public employee salaries and benefits 
Non-Merit Discrimination 
Role of the Military 




























3.  From Civil Service (Stage III) to a Mature Mixed Model (Stage IV) 
Indicator 
Balanced Uniformity - Flexibility 
Balanced Centralization - Decentralization 
Balanced Public - Private Employment 













Source:  Klingner, 1996; Klingner, 2000; Klingner and Nalbandian, 2001; Klingner and 
Pallavicini Campos, 2002; Klingner and Nalbandian, 2003. 
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MEXICO’S PROFESSIONAL CAREER SERVICE LAW IN HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT 
Although Mexico is nominally a federal republic, political power by tradition and 
Constitutional provisions is centralized in the executive branch of the national 
government.  From 1929 until 2000, Mexico was a one-party democracy dominated by 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, for its Spanish acronym).  Following 
widespread allegations of electoral fraud in 1988, Mexico developed a professional civil 
service system for its newly created Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) (Estatuto, 1999; 
Méndez Martínez, 2000).  This organization – designed to increase the validity and 
accountability of national elections by instituting rational and transparent procedures for 
voting, tabulation, and reporting of ballot results – played a pivotal role in the transition 
to multi-party democracy. PRI lost control of the national legislature for the first time in 
1996.  In July 2000, following a hotly contested campaign, the opposition PAN 
(National Action Party) Presidential candidate Vicente Fox won the Presidency.  Most 
Mexicans and international observers credited IFE with a pivotal role in the outcome.  
Its head, José Luis Méndez, became a key advisor to President Fox. 
In April 2003, the Mexican national legislature approved a Professional Career Service 
Law (Ley de Servicio Profesional de Carrera [LSPC]), providing for the implementation 
of a career civil service system in the national government ministries directed through 
the office of the President (Ley, 2003).  Mexico had previously established several 
career service systems for certain occupations within some national government 
agencies (e.g., the Ministry of Foreign Relations [1922], the National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography and Informatics [1994], the National Water Commission [1995], 
teachers within the Ministry of Education [1992], the Internal Revenue Systems [2000] 
and the Federal Electoral Institute [1992, reformed in 1999] (Uvalle Berrones, 2000; 
Méndez Martínez, 2000).  Yet given Mexico’s authoritarian political culture and the 
relative prior scarcity of merit systems in the national government, the LSPC represents 
a significant and ambitious “sea change” in Mexican governance.  It requires that within 
two years each Ministry will establish an advisory committee to develop and administer 
its own SPC, with the entire process coordinated by a Civil Service Agency within the 
Ministry of Public Function (Secretaría de la Función Pública [SFP]) (Acuerdo, 2003).  
The LSPC has three sections:  an introduction, a statement of the rights and 
responsibilities of career service employees, and a description of the system’s structure.  
Most of the law comprises the third section, with seven subsections focused on 
planning, the national HR register, recruitment, professional development, training and 
certification, performance evaluation, and separation. 
 
The national register (registro) maintained centrally by the SFP, collects data to allow 
matching employees and applicants with existing and new positions.  It is the basis for 
career development and training.  Objective performance evaluation systems, and the 
possibility of discharge for poor performance based on them, are innovations in a 
culture that is not accustomed to distinguishing between evaluating persons and 
performance.  While it is privately recognized that complete implementation within two 
years is not possible, it is expected that Ministries will develop elements of the system, 
share “best practices,” and move incrementally but steadily toward a national 
professional career service model. 
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Passage of the LSPC was followed by approval of similar laws in many of Mexico’s 31 
states, including the Federal District (DF), Sinaloa, Guanajuato, Mexico (the State that 
surrounds the DF on three sides), and Quintana Roo (Ley, 2002).  This is extraordinary, 
given that Mexican public administration is highly centralized and that the LSPC 
applied only to federal ministries.  It is as if the regime change in 2000, passage of the 
LSPC in 2003, and related transformations in political administrative culture gave state 
and local governments implicit permission to make similar advances (Mejía Lira, 2001; 
Moreno Espinosa, 2001; and Moreno Espinosa, 2002; Cabrero Mendoza and García 
Vázquez, 2002).   
Even more remarkably, the LSPC has led to an outpouring of professional, academic 
and popular writing on Mexico’s professional public service and its relation to more 
rational and democratic government.  Contributors include experts from public 
universities (e.g., Uvalle Berrones, 2004); public-private “think tanks” (e.g., Arellano 
Gault, 2004), non-governmental associations such as the Mexican Network for 
Professional Service (Red Mexicana de Servicio Profesional) (Martínez Puón and 
López Cruz, 2004; Aguilera and Bohórquez, 2004), Presidential advisors (e.g., Méndez 
Martínez, 2004, Pérez González, 2004); national government ministries (Mesta 
Delgado, 2004; Herrera Macías, 2004; Fócil Ortega, 2004; Muñoz García, 2004); the 
Federal District (Cedillo Hernández, 2004), and local governments (Acosta Arévalo, 
2004).  For example, one of this article’s authors is a visiting professor at the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) who has taught an intensive course there 
each summer since 1999 on “Professionalizing public human resource management:  A 
comparative US – Mexican perspective” (based on Klingner and Nalbandian, 2001).  
Since 2002, he has taught similar courses and made related conference presentations (in 
the DF, Toluca, Culiacan, Chetumal, and internationally) on Mexican civil service 
reform (Klingner, 2003; Klingner, 2004). 
A cadre of professional public administrators, academicians, and civic reformers – 
many of them these authors’ colleagues and protégées – have founded, published and 
written for professional public administration journals that describe, assess and 
contextualize these reforms (e.g., transparent government, corruption, non-
governmental organizations, and decentralization and career service systems) within the 
context of ongoing political, social and economic transformations.  These include 
Prospectiva (published by the Agrupación Política Nueva) and Gestión y Política 
Pública (published by CIDE).  While Mexico’s prestigious National Public 
Administration Institute (INAP) has remained relatively apart from these advances 
because some within the Fox administration consider it a stronghold of PRI loyalists, 
similar state institutes conduct research, training and technical assistance (e.g., in 
Guanajuato, the Federal District [DF], Quintana Roo and Sinaloa) (Almada López, 
2001). 
Causality is complex.  It is likely that these civic organizations, journals and public 
administration institutes arose simultaneously, spurred by many factors.  Section 3 will 
take a closer look at these reforms and the underlying culture of governance and politics 
in Mexico. 
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GOVERNANCE, POLITICAL CULTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 
IN MEXICO 
Until the historic regime change in 2000, Mexico’s political system was dominated by a 
powerful and authoritarian party that controlled the bureaucracy through a “quasi-spoils 
system” (Arellano Gault, 2003: 169) that combined syndicalism, professionalism and 
patronage.  Lower-level (de base) laborers were – and still are – protected by a 
corporatist system that accords powerful industrial unions the constitutional rights to 
represent this political constituency and protect it through employment contracts 
(Arellano Gault and Guerrero Amparán, 2003: 154).  Technicians, professionals and 
managers were employed “at will” through a nomination process that combined 
political and personal loyalty (patronaje).  This ensured bureaucratic responsiveness, if 
not individual merit or societal accountability. 
Civil service is an indispensable democratic institution.  Neutral professional agencies 
enable government to respond to elected and appointed officials’ policy agendas, while 
protecting long-term policies and programs and avoiding the social costs of politicians 
being able to manipulate administrative agencies with impunity.  But civil service 
systems do not necessarily make government more efficient or effective.  Nor are they 
costless (Frant, 1993).  They affect the way political systems behave (Moe and 
Campbell, 1994; Ackerman, 2000), in that the price for avoiding a “spoils system” is the 
creation of a powerful class of civil servants insulated from political influence by rigid 
rules for hiring, promotion and firing. 
Because of this, the Fox administration’s decision to propose the LSPC was not made 
easily.  Many of his supporters advocated – at least privately – reducing the power of 
unions and avoiding the negative implications of civil service by progressing directly 
from patronage to performance contracting.  But in the end, though it was 
acknowledged that it would limit the flexibility of his administration to control the 
administration’s reform agenda, the benefits of a professional and politically insulated 
federal bureaucracy prevailed.  Congress passed the bill without much opposition, and 
implementation began immediately. 
Yet successful implementation of the LSPC faces resistance from some powerful 
appointed officials, some managers and many union leaders.  This in turn reflects 
underlying political, social and cultural conditions that will make implementation slow, 
tortuous and problematic.  First, there is a need to change the political culture of 
absolutist political control and administrative formalism, while still allowing political 
leadership and centralized policy direction to function effectively.  (In this context, 
absolutism is the centralization of political, economic and social authority in the 
executive office of the President; and administrative formalism is the sub rosa 
functioning of absolute political authority under the trappings of a political and 
administrative system that, on paper, is decentralized and participative.)  This cultural 
change requires strong political support from the President and his Ministers.   Yet some 
appointed officials who realize that the LSPC threatens their power are responding in 
ways that maintain it.  For example, because 2 out of 3 positions on the technical 
committees responsible for civil service implementation in each Ministry are appointed 
(per article 74 of the LSPC), some senior officials are resisting or blocking efforts to 
install strong technical committees.  Civil service reform is not a paramount priority for 
the Fox Administration.  So as a partial solution to this dilemma, it continues to promote 
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a managerial culture of innovation and rational decision-making, without directly 
confronting underlying barriers of political culture and structural resistance. 
Second, there is a need to develop a professional public administrative culture that 
clearly differentiates between political appointees and senior civil servants.  
Historically, the culture and practice of absolute political control made it difficult to 
hold individuals accountable.  The result was a heavily politicized bureaucracy within 
which political appointees and professional administrators were almost 
indistinguishable, and could not be held individually accountable (Guerrero Amparán, 
1999).  Ambitious administrators were accustomed to using their positions to build 
political careers.  However, a civil service system differentiates these two roles.  Even 
political appointees are held accountable for their ministries’ performance, given that 
these agencies have a public purpose beyond advancing the political careers of their 
appointed heads.  Some political appointees will seek to develop administrative systems 
that on their face resemble civil service, but in reality leave intact the traditional 
hierarchical culture personal and legal authority (caudillismo) a Secretary and his or her 
leadership team used to enjoy in their Ministry.  Once again, Presidential support is 
crucial, as is support from public officials, media and society in general, for 
transforming these historically linked political and administrative systems. 
The third dilemma is how to make the professional career service system legitimate 
(strong and effective), but still responsive to needs for managerial flexibility and 
political oversight.  This requires careful balancing of administrative and political 
perspectives, recognizing that each value, carried to extremes, will subvert the intent of 
the system.  The danger, of course, is that political resistance will lead to weak or poorly 
resourced Ministerial committees, and thus to limited implementation.  Reformers who 
force the process will face resistance.  But if they allow some Ministries to implement 
weak committees, the reform process may become a charade (i.e., administrative 
formalism). 
Fourth, strong oversight over civil service reform implementation of the civil service is 
crucial if Mexico is to face some of these challenges.  Per article 70 of the LSPC, the 
oversight agency (the Civil Service Advisory Committee) is composed of political and 
administrative appointees:  nine from the SFP, one from the technical committees of 
each of the other Ministries (about 15), three from the Ministries of Labor, Treasury and 
the Interior, and one representative from academic, private and social sectors.  Thus, 
only 3 of about 30 members are not direct representatives of a particular Ministry and 
its political leadership.  Without the opportunity for open participation from groups and 
citizens with a more generalized interest in a professional public service, it is likely that 
the Advisory Board will be “captured” by more particular agency interests, weakening 
its autonomy and ability to exercise independent oversight over the system. 
Fifth, the creation in law of a class of professional public managers by no means 
guarantees that they will develop the values or behaviors appropriate to effective and 
transparent management.  In Mexico as in other countries, administrative processes that 
are rational and transparent “on paper” frequently mask an authoritarian political 
culture.  While passage of the LSPC and creation of an oversight Committee is of 
course necessary for reform, it does not in itself promote managerial flexibility or 
professionalism (Knott and Miller, 1987; Pacheco, 2003: 44).  An oversight Committee 
focused on values of political neutrality and Ministerial accountability for performance 
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might succeed in implementing a limited civil service system that meets legal 
requirements.  But building a system that objectively evaluates individual performance 
evaluation requires time and the political will to adjust administrative structures, make 
people confident of the application of the rules, learn the difficulties of measuring 
performance in hundreds of different positions, and develop the skills needed to manage 
a decentralized system with several different specialized entities (ministries, offices and 
agencies).  Simply promoting managerial discourse around these concepts or issues 
does not ensure that managers will learn and practice the complex behaviors required 
for the system to operate effectively.  Separating evaluations of employee performance 
from evaluations of employee as persons is a difficult change to implement.  But it is 
part of the business culture, and will become more part of the public culture as business 
values spread, and as the professional public administration culture becoming more 
widespread.  The most probable outcome is that by the end of the Fox administration’s 
term of office in December 2006, Mexico will have a limited version of the system, 
dominated by top-level appointed officials, and minimally accountable to outside 
interests, with limited performance evaluation capability due to lack of time and 
expertise. 
Sixth, civil service reformers must confront the reality of corruption as part of Mexico’s 
political culture.  The SFP – also the lead agency charged with fighting corruption – is 
not noted for its success in this area (Rosenberg, 2003).  But it is noted for its tendency 
toward hierarchical decision-making based on rigid compliance with rules and 
procedures.  Whether this culture can nurture the managerial flexibility and risk-taking 
required for implementing a performance-based personnel system remains to be seen. 
Seventh, implementation of the LSPC highlights the power struggle between the 
Executive and Legislative branches in Mexican national politics.  Legislative oversight 
is critical to effective implementation, particularly if the change in administration that 
will take place in December 2006 (Mexican presidents serve a six-year term and may 
not succeed themselves) is not to result in the loss of professional administrative 
capacity and organizational memory.  But Mexico has a history of a strong Executive 
and a weak Legislative branch.  Congress was not actively involved in developing the 
LSPC, and the Executive branch did not seek its involvement. 
Eighth, the LSPC applies to only about 40,000 mid-level federal managers and 
professionals.  Its coverage needs to be extended to the rest of the 2.5 million federal 
public employees.  About 1 million of these are teachers with their own politically 
powerful union and relatively inflexible labor rules; about 600,000 are nurses and other 
medical professionals.  Others (known as de base workers) are protected by membership 
in a politically powerful federation of unions (the FSTSE, or Federation of State 
Workers Unions) that, under Mexican law, is their only legitimate contractual 
representative and bargaining agent.  Creating a general civil service system for all 
federal employees will require changes in at least two federal laws:  the Federal Law for 
State Workers (to allow merit-based evaluations) and the Federal Work Law (to 
recognize productivity as a legitimate basis for employee evaluation).  The first is 
unlikely given the FSTSE’s opposition.  The second remains possible, but it is not clear 
whether the current political situation will allow the Fox administration to successfully 
propose these reforms to Congress. 
In sum, there are clear signs of progress:  an ambitious law, flexible and decentralized 
administrative control under a centralized oversight agency, clear action items and 
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implementation deadlines, and a dedicated implementation team with a clear vision 
beyond bureaucratic or managerial “business as usual” (no routine copying of “best 
practices” or “buzzwords” from the private sector).  However, the challenges are high 
and support from society and civil servants is crucial if a true career system, flexible and 
capable of adapting to new situations, is to be successfully implemented.  Because 
resistance by powerful and entrenched interests is great, the forces that overcome 
resistance must be equally powerful and determined.  While Mexicans may agree that 
civil service reform is crucial to the transformation of Mexico into a more accountable 
and legitimate democracy, few have a clear conception of the road ahead or the dangers 
to be faced. 
 
BENCHMARKING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN MEXICO 
TODAY 
Broadly speaking, public administration reform means the same thing in Mexico as in 
the US.  Its fundamental objective is to create a more innovative, flexible, problem 
solving, and entrepreneurial culture within public agencies (Barzelay, 1992; Kettl, 1997; 
Rosenbloom, 1998; Kettl, 2000; and Brudney et al., 2000).  This means improving the 
transparency of government by emphasizing citizen participation and decentralization; 
and the rationality of government by emphasizing innovation, entrepreneurial 
leadership, and customer service.  In Mexico, it also means replacing traditional, 
hierarchical and process-oriented public administration with a more results-oriented, 
customer-driven, market-based approach. 
The Mexican national government introduced a broad series of public administrative 
reforms during the administration of President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000).  Politically, 
these reforms were designed to reinforce the dominant political party’s (PRI’s) position 
that fundamental change was possible within what was essentially a centralized, 
hierarchical one-party system.  Administratively, they were designed to make agencies 
more effective by increasing the efficiency, transparency, and customer service and 
market orientation of what traditionally had been a relatively inefficient, non-
transparent, corrupt, politicized, and self-serving federal bureaucracy. 
These reforms had some success.  Based on more than ten years of research on 
decentralized municipal governance throughout Mexico, Cabrero Mendoza (2000) 
identified four general types of innovation – new leadership styles, new mechanisms for 
broader citizen participation, strengthened intergovernmental relations, and new 
management systems.  For him, the potential conflict between the business culture 
underlying public administrative reforms and the political-administrative culture 
underlying traditional public administration presents public administrators with a 
dilemma.  Reforms may have made public programs more efficient and rational, but 
only by maintaining hierarchical control at the expense of broader citizen and 
community participation.  Arellano Gault (2002) addressed the classic conflict between 
top-down and bottom-up change strategies.  How is government supposed to make the 
Draconian changes in organizational climate and political culture required to achieve 
decentralized, effective and efficient customer service?  How can Mexicans make any 
fundamental changes in municipal government where public employment, revenue 
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collection, and service delivery are all controlled by a national government that is 
heavily politicized, bitterly partisan, and fundamentally hierarchical and conservative? 
Thus, any long-term assessment of the effectiveness of public administration reforms in 
Mexico must take place within a larger discussion of the critical economic, social, and 
political and administrative issues this country now faces.  And it should be 
benchmarked using available objective metrics to assess change in each of these areas. 
 
Economic Reform Indicators 
The trade liberalization and economic development intended through NAFTA may have 
stimulated economic growth in Mexico.  The economy did not crash precipitously in 
2001, as it did in 1995 following the corruption- and devaluation-plagued Salinas de 
Gotari Administration (1988-1994).  On the other hand, Mexico’s rate of economic 
growth has exceed 6% annually only twice in the past decade (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3:  Mexican Gross Domestic Product, by Year (1993-2003) 
Mexican Gross Domestic Product, by Year



















Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática (INEGI).  Sistema de 
Cuentas Nacionales de México. Cuentas de Bienes y Servicios 1988-1997. Tomo II. 
México 1999. Estadísticas Económicas. Productos Interno Bruto Trimestral de 
1999.INEGI. México 1999. 
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Employment statistics can be questioned in a country plagued by chronic employee 
migration (internal and external) and underemployment, but there is evidence that 
Mexico has experienced sufficient job creation to meet population growth and avoid 
social and political instability.  Unemployment has hovered between 2% and 4% every 
year between 1992 and 2002, except for 2005 when it crested at 6.5% (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4:  Mexican Unemployment Rate (1992-2002)  
Mexican Unemployment Rate, 1992 - 2002


















Source: Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano. http//:dgnesyp.INEGI.gob.mx/cgi-
win/bdieintsi.exe/Consultar. (March 2005) 
Optimists report an increased willingness to address divisive political issues like 
privatization (including such “sacred cows” as petroleum and electric power.  For 
example, Rubio (2004) concludes that autonomous agencies like oil production and 
refining (PEMEX), telecommunications (CFE) and power and light (Luz y Fuerza) have 
become impediments to the development of newer and more efficient energy source.  
However, the recent negative experiences of Brazil and Argentina with neo-liberal 
reforms make their negative reception in Mexico understandable, particularly among 
more conservative, populist and nationalist PRI politicians (Entrevista, 2005).  
Therefore, most Mexican commentators think that their country is successfully steering 
a course between the contrasting values of neo-liberalism and social welfare, including 
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reforms that require PEMEX to work with foreign oil companies to increase production 
and refining capacity (Cervantes, 2004).   
Finally, Mexican legal reforms since 1991 reflect continued strengthening of laws 
related to enforcement of business contracts, debt collection, land registries, and other 
provisions facilitative of economic growth and external investment (see Tables 5-7). 
 
Table 5:  Laws to Promote National Economic Development and Foreign Investment  
Year Law, Regulation or Executive Order 
1991 Ley de la Propiedad Industrial 
(Industrial Property Law) 
 
1993 Acuerdo por el que se crea la Comisión 
Intersecretarial para la Vigilancia y 
Salvaguarda de los Derechos de propiedad 
intelectual 
 
(Agreement to create an Inter-Ministerial 
Commission for the Recognition and 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights) 
 
2000 Acuerdo por el que se determinan la 
organización, funciones y Circunscripción 
de las Oficinas Regionales del Instituto 
Mexicano de la Propiedad Industrial 
 
(Agreement to Establish the Structure, 
Functions and Authority of Regional 
Offices of the Mexican Institute for 
Industrial Property) 
 
Source:  Instituto Mexicano de la Propiedad Industrial. (IMPI) 
http://www.impi.gob.mx/impi/jsp/indice_all.jsp?OpenFile=docs/marco_j/3w002100.ht
m.  (March 2005) 
 
Table 6:  New Mexican Laws to Promote Social and Economic Development  
Ley de Ascensos de la Armada de México (25/06/2004) 
Ley de Asistencia Social (02/09/2004) 
Ley de Cámaras Empresariales y sus Confederaciones (20/01/2005) 
Ley de Derechos Indígenas (21/05/2003) 
Ley de Desarrollo Rural 
Ley de Desarrollo Social (20/01/2004) 
Ley de Fiscalización Superior de la Federación (29/12/2000) 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 7  ·  Issue 1  ·  2006  ·  © International Public Management Network 
82 
 
Ley de Ingresos de la Federación para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2005 (24/11/2004) 
Ley de Seguridad Nacional (31/01/2005) 
Ley de Servicio Público Civil de Carrera 
Ley de Registro Público Vehicular (31/01/2005) 
Ley en contra de la Discriminación 
Ley Federal de Responsabilidad Patrimonial de Estado (31/12/04) 
Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información (11/06/2004) 
Ley Federal de Transparencia y Ordenamiento de los Servicios Financieros 
(26/01/2004) 
Ley General de Bienes Nacionales (20/05/2004) 
Source: Cámara de Diputados. Congreso de la Unión. www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo  
 
Table 7:  Secured Titles, Rural Land Registry (1998-2004) 




















Source: Registro Agrario Nacional. 
http//:www.ran.gob.mx/archivos/estadísticas/constancias.pdf.  (March 2005) 
 
Socio-Political Reform Indicators 
To allow economic growth and social equity, the trend toward decentralized policy 
direction, broad-based political participation, and decentralized and flexible 
administrative implementation should continue. 
Table 8 provides some evidence of this, based on increased income transfers from the 
national government to the DF from 2001-2003. 
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income (excludes the 
Federal District) 
 












62, 171 150 68, 486 239 69, 945 789 
Source: INEGI. Estadística Anual de las Finanzas Públicas Estatales. 
http//:www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/español/tematicos/mediano/med.asp?t=fipu09
&c=5028.  (March 2005) 
As is typical of countries at the onset of a democratic reform process, Mexico supports 
the rapid expansion of democracy but has not yet developed the institutions necessary to 
preserve it.  This means that traditional hierarchies will need to be replaced by new 
patterns of authority appropriate to the coming knowledge-based era.  These patterns 
will need to be decentralized (rather than centralized), achieved (rather than ascribed), 
and participative (based on trust, performance and competence rather than dominance).  
Building democracy also requires basic changes in society, politics and public 
administration.  For public administration, it means rational and transparent budgeting, 
meaningful program planning and evaluation, and a merit-based civil service capable of 
either providing quality public services or effectively overseeing a rational and public 
service-oriented contracting and privatization process (Siegel, 1999).  It means 
professional, transparent, rational, decentralized, and participative administrative 
processes that are in turn tied to objective performance measures and citizen 
accountability (Kettl, 1997).  Public administrative reform implementation in Mexico is 
fundamentally similar in some respects (e.g., the common focus on building a public 
management that is rational, transparent, effective, participative, and customer-focused) 
to its US counterpart.  But it is also fundamentally different, particularly with respect to 
things we take for granted: an effective multi-party political system, functionally 
decentralized state and local governments, a professional civil service, and 
administrative processes that are relatively open, responsive, and subject to the rule of 
law.   
There is some evidence that Mexican politics is becoming more decentralized and 
transparent.  A study recently completed by the National Legislature concluded that 
between 1997 and 2000 the legislature had become a more effective counterweight to 
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executive power, and evaluated the relative transparency of 43 legislative commissions 
(see Table 9). Presidential dominance over legislative activity declined from 80% in 
1982-1988, to 60% in 1988-1994, and 44-45% thereafter (see Table 10).  PRI lost its 
absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly in 1996, and political pluralism has 
increases since then (see Table 11).  Political decentralization continues, transferring 
more functions to state or local government and providing adequate financial resources 
and autonomy to allow state and municipal managers to manage to budget and to results 
(see Table 8, presented previously). 
 
Table 9: Comparative Transparency and Effectiveness (1997-2000) of the 43 
Commissions Established by the National Legislature  
Most Transparent  
 




Comisión de Ciencia y TECNOLOGÍA 




Radio, Televisión y cinematografía,  
(Radio, television and film) 
 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
(Ministry of Labor and Public Finance) 
 
Least Transparent Participación Ciudadana 




DF y Cultura 
Reforma del Estado 
Café 
 
Most Successful  
 




Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública 
Equidad y Género 
Economía 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
Energía y Seguridad Social (tied) 
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Source: “Desempeño Legislativo: Diputados Rezagados.”. Reforma, June 27, 2004. 
 
Table 10:  Comparative Presidential Dominance over Legislative Matters (1982-2003) 
Comparative Presidential Dominance over Legislative 
Matters




















Source. Ibarra, David. Estado de Derecho, Constitución e Instituciones. En Proceso, 
Mexico, May 31, 2004. 
 
Table II: Political Composition of the Legislative Assembly (2001) 
Political Composition of the Legislative Assembly (2001)
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Source: http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx.  (March 2005) 
 
Public Administrative Reform Indicators 
The criteria (e.g., customer service, citizen access, and agency performance) used to 
assess the effectiveness of public administrative reform implementation in the US, 
Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand (Kettl, 1997; and Kettl, 2000) can also be 
used with respect to Mexico.  But reform outcomes will be different, and must be 
evaluated in the Mexican context (Mazarr, 1999: 140-142). 
Some evidence – primarily the rapid growth of public administration institutes and 
professional associations – supports the conclusion that governors of all parties are 
turning increasingly to professionals to staff their administrations, particularly in those 
key positions tied to economic development, public service delivery, finance and 
budgeting, management information systems, and human resource management.  The 
public sector is growing at a relatively small rate, certainly less than the economy or the 
population as a whole (see Table 12).  Increased utilization of governmental complaint 
procedures evidences a slight but notable growth in confidence in governmental 
institutions (see Table 13, and Appendix A). 
 
Table 12:  Annual Variation in Public Sector Gross Domestic Product (1993-2003) 
Category 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total 1.9 2.7 1.7 0.2 1.9 0.0 1.4 1.4 0.5 -0.2 -0.5 
General 
Government 
2.7 1.7 1.1 -0.1 1.7 1.2 1.9 1.1 -1.2 -0.6 -1.7 
Public 
Enterprises 
0.7 4.6 2.7 0.7 2.2 -1.7 0.5 1.7 3.4 0.4 1.2 
Under direct 
control 





-13.1 5.6 3.6 -1.2 8.4 2.2 2.0 2.7 9.1 2.8 1.1 
Non-
Financial 
-8.2 6.1 -0.5 -2.3 11.0 1.6 -1.5 2.2 8.8 -3.0 2.6 
Financial -16.8 5.1 7.2 -0.2 6.4 2.6 4.8 3.1 9.3 7.2 0.2 
Source: INEGI. Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México. “Indicadores 
macroeconómicos del Sector Público”. 
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/tematicos/mediano/med.asp?t=cuna23
&c=1674. ( March 2005) 
 
Table 13:  Requests for Public Information (2003-2004) 
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485 468 17 475 10 
100% 96.49% 3.50% 97.93% 2.06% 
Source: Informe de Labores del Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información Pública 
2003 – 2004 [Report of the Federal Institute for Public Information Access] p. 23.  
Http://www.ifai.org.mx/informe/indice.htm. (Marzo 2005 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mexico is a fascinating place to study public administrative reforms in that these 
contextual differences (compared to the US and other developed countries) shed new 
light on fundamental concerns that European and US scholars have also addressed.  The 
use of economic, social, political and administrative metrics can provide objective 
criteria to measure the progress of public administrative reforms over time. 
Donald E. Klingner, Professor, Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of 
Colorado at Colorado Springs:    Donald.Klingner@uccs.edu 
David Arellano Gault, Professor of Public Administration, CIDE (Centro de 
Investigaciones y Docencia Económicas): David.Arellano@cide.edu 
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280,195 283,098 270,424 256,983 238,124  
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203,607 202,251 210,969 212,457 215,068  
        
Financial 
56,803 37,703 35,849 34,713 32,081 28,788 28,468 26,053  
Source:  Income and Public Expenditures in Mexico [INEGI – Ingreso y el Gasto 
Público en México].  Several Years 
Note: These data represent not the number of persons employed in each activity, but the 
average number of positions required for production processes.  Consequently, the same 
person could be occupying two or more positions in one or several economic activities 
at the same time, as do basic education teachers. 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998/P 1999/P 2000/
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SER   3,703 3,716 3,690 3,747 3,912 3,912 3,957 
SHCP   33,55
0 
45,267 47,446 10,423 10,818 9,625 9,466 
DEFENSA   169,6
89 
172,072 163,638 177,018 183,788 181,708 181,9
44 
SAGARPA   60,50
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SEDESOL   13,60
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9,404 8,608 8,345 8,336 7,239 9,307 
SECTUR   2,373 2,410 2,271 2,321 2,338 2,249 2,212 
SECODAM   1,750 1,756 2,064 2,080 2,675 2,491 2,290 
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a/ Since 1998, IFE is the only electoral body reported. The Electoral Court was 
separated and incorporated into the Supreme Court of Justice  
b/ since 1997 includes the Temporal Employment Program 
Source: Public Federal Treasury Accounts (Different Years) 
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